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ABSTRACT 
Our paper investigates the impact of rising inequality in a two-country macroeconomic model with an 
agent-based household sector characterised by peer effects in consumption. In particular, the model 
highlights the role of inequality in determining diverging balance of payments dynamics within a currency 
union. Inequality may drive the two countries into different growth patterns: where peer effects in 
consumption interact with higher credit availability, rising income inequality leads to the emergence of a 
debt-led growth. Where social norms determine weaker emulation and credit availability is lower, an 
export-led regime arises. Eventually, a crisis emerges endogenously due to the sudden-stop of capital 
ows from the net lending country, triggered by the excessive risk associated to the dramatic amount of 
private debt accumulated by households in the borrowing country. Monte Carlo simulations for a wide 
range of calibrations confirm the robustness of our results. 
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1. Introduction
In the period between the introduction of the Euro and the outburst of
the recent financial crisis, Member States of the European Monetary Union
(EMU) accumulated large current account imbalances that are similar in size
relative to GDP as those of the US or China (Schmitz and Von Hagen, 2011).
In particular, core nations (e.g. Germany, Finland and the Netherlands) ran
large current account surpluses since the early 2000s, while the so-called
periphery (i.e. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) ran marked current
account deficits that increased significantly in the run up to the crisis (Hale
and Obstfeld, 2016; Schmitz and Von Hagen, 2011). Baldwin and Giavazzi
(2015) recently argued that the key driver of such current account imbalances
in the Eurozone is to be found in the fact that, broadly speaking, the core
nations had above-average savings, while the periphery had below-average
savings. As a consequence, in the period 2000-2007, core countries lent to
the peripheral ones thus allowing the latter to run increasingly large current
account deficits,1 a key element of fragility for the Eurozone economy. Indeed,
Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015) and De Grauwe (2013) show that the Eurozone
exhibited a remarkable amount of cross-country capital flows from the core
countries to the periphery after introduction of the Euro and before the
beginning of the Global Financial Crisis.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that such current account imbalances
in the EMU may be explained by the rise of income inequality and the role of
financial liberalisation: Marzinotto (2016) finds that the relaxation of collat-
eral constraints for lower-income groups led to higher household indebtedness
financed through domestic and foreign lending that determined the current
account deficits in the periphery, as well as the surpluses in the core. In
fact, there is a growing literature focusing on the link between the major
rise in income inequality that characterised the global economy in the last 40
years (Atkinson and Morelli, 2011; Milanovic, 2010; Piketty and Saez, 2013)
and the changes in the dynamics of the balance of payments. Kumhof et al.
(2012) for example recently argued that current account deficits in developed
economies are often accompanied by a dramatic increase in income inequality.
The authors point out that the rise in income disparities accounts for a major
1“By 2007, Germany was, on net, lending almost $250 billion per year to other EZ
nations. [...] Spain was by far the largest net borrower, with its capital inflows reaching
$150 billion in the year before the crisis” (Baldwin and Giavazzi, 2015, p. 27).
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part of the large current account deficits in countries like the United States
or the United Kingdom. The authors point to financial liberalisation as the
transmission mechanism from higher inequality to greater current account
deficit: in order to alleviate the living conditions of the lower segments of so-
ciety that are mostly affected by widening income disparities, policy makers
rarely draw on the use of fiscal polices that tackle the structural source of
inequality. Instead, the predominant approach typically relies on facilitating
access to credit markets, that is financial liberalisation in order to prevent a
large drop in the consumption of poor and middle class households (Fitoussi
and Saraceno, 2011; Kumhof et al., 2012; Stockhammer, 2015; Cardaci and
Saraceno, 2016).The main consequence of higher inequality in this financially
lax context is that households at the bottom of the income distribution bor-
row from both domestic and foreign institutions in order to keep up with
social consumption norms in the face of stagnant or falling real wages (Be-
labed et al., 2013; Stockhammer, 2015). This eventually leads to a financial
account surplus, on the one hand, and rising consumption and current ac-
count deficit, on the other hand. Hence, the economy turns into a debt-led
growth regime in which household debt accumulation sustains consumption
and aggregate demand only temporarily. In fact, the heavy debt burden that
spreads in the system jeopardises economic stability by triggering a series of
defaults and a recession (Cardaci, 2016; Russo et al., 2016).
Symmetrically, rising income inequality can be associated also with large
current account surpluses in poorly financialised economies that do not allow
poorer households to access both domestic and foreign credit markets to
borrow. The consequence, in this case, is sluggish internal demand and
stagnating imports (Kumhof et al., 2012; Stockhammer, 2015).
Starting from these considerations, we build a two-country macroeco-
nomic model with an agent-based household sector aimed at showing how
the rise of inequality in a currency union leads to the emergence of current
account imbalances. The model is characterised by imitation and peer effects
in household consumption decisions, as well as by the presence of a flexible
bank lending behaviour that allows to replicate different kinds of financiali-
sation scenarios. The model shows that the impact of inequality drives the
two countries into different growth patterns: where peer effects in consump-
tion interact with higher credit availability from both the national and the
foreign banking sector, rising income inequality leads to the emergence of a
debt-led growth. Yet, in the country where social norms determine weaker
emulation and a more parsimonious consumption behaviour, jointly with net
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capital outflows, an export-led regime arises. This results in different growth
regimes with symmetrical boom-and-bust cycles in the two economies, to-
gether with diverging dynamics in the balance of payments. Hence, in our
view, our model represents a suitable theoretical framework that might con-
tribute to the study of the current account imbalances in the Eurozone in
the presence of rising inequality.
The paper is organised as follows: the rest of this section provides a brief
review of some recent macroeconomic models dealing with the impact of
rising inequality in an open economy. In Section 2 we introduce our model,
providing a description of the sequence of events and the key mechanisms at
work; Section 3 discusses our main findings regarding model results and the
sensitivity analysis; Finally, Section 4 concludes.
1.1. Related Macroeconomic Models
In the recent years, a growing number of contributions has analysed the
macroeconomic implications of increasing inequality, with a particular focus
on economic and financial stability. This topic has received particular atten-
tion by the authors in the area of agent-based models (ABM). In general,
there seems to be a consensus on the destabilising effects of rising inequality.
For example, Fischer (2012) builds a simple model with heterogeneous house-
holds showing that increasing inequality leads to higher financial volatility
due to the accumulation of net worth by richer households at the top of
the income distribution. Russo et al. (2016) show that consumer credit con-
tributes to increasing aggregate demand for a short period of time. Even-
tually, greater credit availability exacerbates the tendency of the economic
system towards a crisis, due to the decline of the firms’ profit rate.
Dosi et al. (2013) analyse the effect of inequality under different monetary
and fiscal policies. Their model includes Keynesian mechanisms of demand
generation, a Schumpeterian innovation-fuelled process of growth with Min-
skian credit dynamics. Their results show that more unequal societies suffer
from more severe business cycles fluctuations as well as higher unemployment
rates. This increases the likelihood of economic crises.
Cardaci (2016) and Cardaci and Saraceno (2016) study the consequence
of rising inequality in a macro ABM. The former introduces peer effects in
consumption and a housing market that allows for home-equity extraction,
while the latter focus on different consumer-credit regimes. Both papers
conclude that increasing income inequality leads to the emergence of business
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fluctuations as a consequence of a massive accumulation of household debt
that sustains consumption at the price o greater instability.
All these contributions, however, investigate the impact of inequality and
financial deepening in a closed economy. Hence, our model differs in that
we are interested in the implications of widening income disparities in the
context of an open economy. Our research question is in line with other recent
works that, however, do not use an ABM approach. For example, Belabed
et al. (2013) build a three-country macroeconomic model in the tradition of
Post-Keynesian economics and the Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) approach
spawned by Godley and Lavoie (2007). This open-economy model analyses
the interplay of household income inequality and current account imbalances,
with the inclusion of imitating behaviour in consumption decisions. The
model is calibrated by using data for the United States, China and Germany.
Their results show that the major increase in household debt and the decrease
in the current account in the United States in the years preceding the recent
crisis can be explained by the rise in top-end household income inequality.
Another relevant work discussing this topic is the model by Kumhof et al.
(2012). The authors build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model that investigates the impact of greater inequality in a two-country set-
ting, which shows that financial liberalisation allows households to smooth
consumption at the cost of greater debt accumulation and larger current ac-
count deficits. Their model features workers and investors, with the former
having declining income share at the expense of investors. Hence, work-
ers obtain loans from domestic and foreign investors that support aggregate
demand at the price of an expanding current account deficit.
2. The Model
Our work builds upon Cardaci and Saraceno (2016) by extending the
macroeconomic agent-based model developed therein to a two-country econ-
omy in order to emphasise the role of inequality in determining diverging
dynamics of the balance of payments within a currency union. Our mod-
elling strategy relies on the KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid!) principle, in
that our assumptions aim at accounting only for the relevant elements of
the story we want to describe, thus discarding other features which would
certainly enrich the model but would also increase its complexity.
The two countries in our model are denoted by the subscript c = A,B,
and they have the same number of heterogeneous households (h = 1, ..., H),
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a commercial bank (b), an aggregate productive sector (f), a government (g)
and a national central bank (cb). We assume the two economies belong to a
currency union and, as such, we include a common supranational central bank
(ccb). Thus, in an extremely simplified manner, the framework of our model
replicates the general setting of the Eurozone, including a rather stylised
version of the Target 2 mechanism.2
Each agent in our model is endowed with a balance sheet that tracks the
levels of all stock variables at any point in time. This is meant to guarantee
stock-flow consistency, so that “every monetary flow, in accordance with the
double-entry book keeping logic, is recorded as a payment for one sector and
a receipt for another sector, and every financial stock is recorded as an asset
for a sector and a liability for another sector” (Caiani et al., 2014, p. 425).
The essential features of our open economy are as follow:
• Each country has one aggregate productive sector only, which is owned
by all households and distributes all its earnings thus retaining zero
profits. Also, there is no investment in capital goods. The supply side
of the economy is simplified to a feedback mechanism that mechanically
reacts to changes in aggregate demand.
• Heterogeneous households’ desired consumption is based on imitative
behaviour, in line with recent contributions in behavioural economics
(Frank et al., 2014).
• Income distribution is based on individual income shares that are con-
stant over time. These are drawn from a Pareto distribution, which
is identical in the two countries. This is consistent with empirical ev-
idence suggesting that income is generally distributed according to a
power-law distribution and, more specifically, to a Pareto, particularly
at top of the income scale (Clementi and Gallegati, 2005; Jones, 2015).
• Households can allocate consumption between domestic and foreign
goods so that international trade occurs in the economy.
2It is worth pointing out that the Target 2 mechanism does not represent the core of our
analysis, as our focus is on the implications of rising inequality and financial deepening. For
this reason we leave the discussion on the design of the Target 2 mechanism to Appendix
Appendix A.
6
• Each country has a representative commercial bank that extends non-
collateralised consumption loans to households.
The functioning of the economy is therefore identical in the two countries.
There is only one exception: we assume that the banking sector of B is willing
to provide credit both at home and abroad, whereas the commercial bank in
A only lends to the domestic households. Such feature is meant to design
a theoretical framework that resembles the dynamics that took place in the
Eurozone, as reported by Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015), where country A acts
as the periphery of the Eurozone, while B represents the core.
Our model has a sequential structure. Hence, the sequence of events in
each country is as follows:
1. Production. The firm produces homogenous perishable goods using
domestic labour as the only input.
2. Income distribution. The firm distributes wages to households in
the same country. The commercial bank distributes a fraction of its
profits (if any) to domestic households. This distribution process is
based on the above-mentioned individual income shares.
3. Government revenues. Households pay taxes on income based on
an exogenous progressive taxation system. Collected taxes add up to
the government deposit account held at the national central bank.3
4. Desired consumption and financial assessment. Each house-
hold computes her desired consumption based on imitative behaviour.
Households can be savers if internal resources are higher than desired
consumption and due debt – thus holding savings in the form of zero
interest rate deposits – or borrowers, otherwise. Note that borrowers
can obtain loans in order to finance desired consumption as well as to
rollover their debt, that is, to pay back the debt from the previous
period.
5. Policy targets. Policy institutions decide their targets: the supra-
national central bank sets the policy interest rate while the national
3Our model also allows for the presence of public debt since the government can supply
bonds bought by households with positive savings. However, the amount of taxes collected
by the government is always enough to finance public expenditure in all the simulations.
Hence, de facto, the bond market never opens. For this reason, in order to simplify the
description of our model structure and results, bond supply and demand are omitted (and
greyed in figure 1). The complete model is available upon request.
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government sets its desired public expenditure. Both decisions follow
a counter-cyclical rule based on the value of the “demand gap” in the
previous period.
6. First pay-back-phase (PBP). Households pay back the loan (prin-
cipal plus interest) from the previous period. Borrowers who lack the
internal resources to meet their debt obligations enter the credit mar-
ket to roll over their debt. Afterwards, they will go through a second
PBP in order to repay the loan from the previous period.
7. Credit market. The commercial bank sets its total available credit
supply as a function of its equity and total credit demand. The bank
ranks households in ascending order based on their financial soundness.
Loan applications, computed by households at step 4, are satisfied until
the bank runs out of total credit supply. This implies that credit-
rationing may occur in the market: more financially fragile households
may not obtain any loan from the commercial bank. Credit-rationed
households will not be able to finance their desired consumption entirely
and to roll over their debt. Hence they will go bankrupt and as such
they will not be allowed to apply for a new loan for a number of periods.
The second PBP then opens: households who successfully obtained a
new loan now pay back the loan from the previous period.
8. Goods market. Based on the ratio between domestic and foreign
prices, households allocate their demand between the two countries.
For simplicity, we assume that the national government only buys do-
mestic goods, based on its desired level of expenditure. If the output
produced by the firm at the beginning of each period is lower than
demand, rationing takes place. On the contrary, in case of excess sup-
ply, we assume the firm gets rid of the unsold amount of its perishable
goods at no cost.
9. Macroeconomic closure. Finally, all the macroeconomic variables
(e.g. GDP, public and private debt, balance of payments) are updated.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of all the transaction flows
in our economy, as described by the sequence reported above, while Table 1
represents the balance sheets for each typology of agent, with the following
stock variables for each country c: household deposits (Dt,h,c), loans (Lt,h,c),
government deposits (Dt,g,c), reserves (Rt,c), firm deposits (Dt,f,c), central
bank loans (LCBt,c), Target 2 claims for the national central bank (T2At,c),
Target 2 liabilities for the national central bank (T2Lt,c). The model could
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easily be adapted to become more general: in this case, The Target 2 balances
would become reserves for the national central banks (and the exchange rate
regime would have to be modeled).
Figure 1: Transaction flows in our economy.
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HouseholdsA
Assets Liabilities
Dt,h,A Lt,h,A
BankA
Assets Liabilities
Lt,h,A Dt,h,A
Rt,A Dt,f,A
LCBt,A
FirmA
Assets Liabilities
Dt,f,A
GovernmentA
Assets Liabilities
Dt,g,A
CentralBankA
Assets Liabilities
T2At,A T2Lt,A
LCBt,A Rt,A
Dt,g,A
HouseholdsB
Assets Liabilities
Dt,h,B Lt,h,B
BankB
Assets Liabilities
Lt,h,B Dt,h,B
Rt,B Dt,f,B
LCBt,B
FirmB
Assets Liabilities
Dt,f,B
GovernmentB
Assets Liabilities
Dt,g,B
CentralBankB
Assets Liabilities
T2At,B T2Lt,B
LCBt,B Rt,B
Dt,g,B
CCB
Assets Liabilities
T2Lt,A T2At,A
T2Lt,A T2At,B
Table 1: Agents’ balance sheets in our economy.
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2.1. Households
Household disposable income is the sum of wages (wt,h,c) and profits from
the commercial bank of the country (pit,h,c), net of taxes (Tt,h,c).
ydt,h,c = wt,h,c + pit,h,c − Tt,h,c (1)
Wages are distributed by the firm at the beginning of each period t. In
particular, the firm allocates the entire amount of revenues (Dt−1,F ) to all
households based on constant individual income shares that are drawn from a
Pareto distribution (see Figure 2 in Section 3). Additionally, we assume that
the bank distributes a fixed share (δ) of its profits (if any) to the household
sector based on the same exogenous individual income shares.
Consumption behaviour in our model is based on peer effects and imi-
tation, in line with the empirical literature on behavioural economics show-
ing that households tend to learn consumption patterns from their social
reference group, thereby comparing their living standard with that of their
neighbours or richer households (Cardaci, 2016; Fazzari and Cynamon, 2013).
Our formulation is very similar to the Expenditure Cascades hypothesis in-
troduced by Frank et al. (2014) and relies on upward-looking comparisons.
Cdt,h,c = k ydt,h,c + acCt−1,j,c (2)
ac = a− ap (3)
Equation 2 describes h’s desired consumption as a function of her dispos-
able income (ydt,h) and the actual previous-period consumption of j, who is
the household ranking just above h in the income scale (i.e. j = h+ 1, based
on ascending disposable income ranking). k is the propensity to consume out
of disposable income and it is unrelated to income level or rank (Frank et al.,
2014), while ac is the country-specific effective rate of imitation, that is a
sensitivity measure such that 0 ≤ ac ≤ 1. When ac = 1, the impact of j on
h’s consumption is maximum; whereas when ac = 0, there is no expenditure
cascade. Equation 3 shows the calculation of the imitation sensitivity. This
follows the approach introduced by Belabed et al. (2013): we assume that
all individuals are associated with a “natural rate of imitation”, a, which is
grounded in the the quest for social status and upward-looking comparisons
and it is unrelated to country-specific factors. However, the effective rate
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of imitation, ac, is computed by subtracting a penalty rate, ap, from the
natural rate. As argued by Belabed et al. (2013), the penalty rate reflects
country-specific elements – such as the provision of public goods, the level of
social protection expenditure relative to GDP, the amount of public spending
in health, and so on – which lower the extent to which households seek to
emulate their richer peers.
Eventually, households assess their own financial position: positive sav-
ings take the form of zero interest rate deposits held at the commercial bank
of the same country. On the contrary, if the sum of desired consumption
and the repayment on home and foreign loans from the previous period
(RSct−1,h,c +RS
−c
t−1,h,c) is greater than the sum of disposable income and past
deposits, households have a positive demand for loans (Ldt,h).
4
Ldt,h,c = max{0, Cdt,h,c +RSt−1,h,c +RS−ct−1,h,c − ydt,h,c −Dt−1,h,c} (4)
Notice that borrowers in A are assumed to have a home bias, such that
they first apply for a loan to the banking sector in their country. Hence, only
in case of rationing in the domestic credit market, they will send their loan
applications abroad to the commercial bank in B.
Additionally, the actual individual demand for consumption is defined as
the minimum between desired consumption and household deposits, that is
min(Cdt,h,c, Dt,h,c). Indeed, if h is credit-rationed she is not able to finance
her desired consumption in full. In this case, demand for consumption is
constrained by the amount of household deposit.
Eventually households allocate individual demand at home and abroad
(DCct,h,c and DC
−c
t,h,c respectively), based on the ratio between domestic and
foreign prices (Pt,c/Pt,−c) multiplied by a sensitivity parameter (γ) (Equa-
tions 5 and 6).5
DCct,h,c =
(
1− γ Pt,c
Pt,−c
)
min(Cdt,h,c, Dt,h,c) (5)
DC−ct,h,c =
(
γ
Pt,c
Pt,−c
)
min(Cdt,h,c, Dt,h,c) (6)
4The repayment schedule on both home and foreign loans is defined in section 2.4.
5Notice that γ is a positive parameter such that 1− γ Pt,cPt,−c ≥ 0 and γ
Pt,c
Pt,−c
≥ 0, that is
individual demand (at home or abroad) cannot be negative.
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2.2. Firms
In order to keep the structure of the model as simple as possible, we have
introduced a rather simplified aggregate productive sector in each country,
with a representative firm owned by the domestic population. Each firm
distributes wages to the household sector based upon the already mentioned
individual Pareto shares.
The two firms also set total production (Qt,c) and prices (Pt,c) by react-
ing to disequilibria in the goods market, as described by Equations 7 and 8.
That is, Qt,c and Pt,c depend on their previous period level and on a sensi-
tivity parameter (φQ,c and φP,c respectively) multiplied by the demand gap
(gapt−1,c).
Qt,c = Qt−1,c (1 + φQ,c · gapt−1,c) (7)
Pt,c = Pt−1,c (1 + φP,c · gapt−1,c) (8)
The demand gap measures the real term excess demand or supply and it is
defined as the difference between aggregate demand (ADt,c) and production,
divided by production itself (Equation 9).
gapt,c =
ADt,c −Qt,c
Qt,c
(9)
Finally, aggregate demand (Equation 10) is the sum of private desired
consumption, government spending (Gdt,c, defined in the next section) and
exports, which are computed as the sum of individual demand for goods by
foreign households.
ADt,c =
∑
h∈c
DCct,h,c +G
d
t,c +
∑
h∈−c
DCct,h,−c (10)
2.3. Government
The government in each country sets the ratio of desired public spend-
ing over GDP at the beginning of each period, based on a counter-cyclical
rule. In particular, the initial value of the ratio
(
Gd
GDP
)
changes based on its
sensitivity (φG) to the demand gap in the previous period.
Gdt,c
GDPt−1,c
=
(
Gdc
GDPc
− φG gapt−1,c
)
(11)
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2.4. Banks
On the demand side, the credit market features households who apply for
a loan in order to finance their desired consumption or to pay back the loan
from the previous period. Additionally, some borrowers in financial distress
can do both.
The formation of credit supply follows the mechanism described in Car-
daci and Saraceno (2016): the commercial bank sets the maximum allow-
able credit supply (LSt,c) as the minimum between a multiple of its equity
(NWBt,c) and a fraction (vt,c) of total credit demand (LDt,c).
LSt,c = min
[
NWBt,c
β
; vt,c LDt,c
]
(12)
A few remarks are necessary. First of all, notice that β identifies the
capital requirement coefficient so that, in line with the regulatory framework
introduced by Basel III (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011),
the commercial bank has to comply with a prudential regulation.
Secondly, as already mentioned, bank B is allowed to lend internationally,
so that the total credit demand (i.e. the sum of individual demand for loans
by households) in B is equal to LDt,B =
∑
h∈A L
d
t,h,A +
∑
h∈B L
d
t,h,B, while
LDt,A =
∑
h∈A L
d
t,h,A.
Finally, also note that vt,c ∈ [vmin, vmax]. That is, each commercial bank
endogenously changes the value of vt,c within two boundaries (vmin and vmax)
that are exogenously set in the initialisation phase of the model (Conditions
13 and 14). In particular, vt,c, which can be interpreted as the willingness
to lend of the banking system, evolves as a function of systemic risk which
is proxied by the household debt-to-GDP ratio (Xt,c) in the previous period.
The evolution depends on a sensitivity threshold (χ), so that if the ratio is
higher (lower) than the threshold, the commercial bank decreases (increases)
vt,c.
vt,c =
{
vt−1,c + φv(vmin − vt−1,c) if Xt,c > χ (13)
vt−1,c + φv(vmax − vt−1,c) if Xt,c ≤ χ (14)
Notice that the two commercial banks are assumed to have the same
sensitivity to system risk. However, while the bank in A is sensitive only to
the household debt in A, the bank in B focuses on the mean of the debt ratio
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in the two countries, as its credit supply targets households of both A and
B.
The bank in each country ranks households in ascending order based
on a measure of their financial soundness – namely the total debt service
ratio (TDS), defined as the ratio between household repayment schedule
and disposable income – and supplies credit by matching each individual
demand until it exhausts its credit supply. As already mentioned, households
in A apply for a loan to the commercial bank of the same country. Once
credit availability falls down to zero, households eventually send their loan
applications to the foreign bank in B. This circumstance takes place whenever
vt,A < 1: in this case less financially sound applicants, that is households with
a higher TDS, will be rationed on the domestic credit market. As a result,
they apply for a loan at the commercial bank in B. If vt,B < 1, households
will be credit rationed also in B and, as a consequence, they will not be
able to pay back their previous loan and, in some cases, finance their desired
consumption entirely. Therefore, they will go bankrupt, thus being excluded
from the credit market for a limited number of periods (identified by the
parameter freeze.).
We assume each loan is a one-period debt contract corresponding to a
repayment schedule defined as RSt,h,c = Lt,h,c(1 + r
L
t,h,c), to be paid back
entirely in the following period. In line with Cardaci (2016), Cardaci and
Saraceno (2016) and Russo et al. (2016), the interest rate on loans is made
of three components (Equation 15).
rLt,h,c = rt + r̂t,c + rt,h,c (15)
r̂t is a system-specific component that reflects the sensitivity (ρ) of the
bank to systemic risk (i.e. the household debt-to-GDP ratio) of the economy,
so that r̂t,A = ρ
debtt−1,A
GDPt−1,A
and r̂t,B = ρ
debtt−1
GDPt−1
. Eventually, rt,h,c is a household-
specific component equal to µTDSt,h,c, where µ is the bank sensitivity to
the household total debt service ratio. Finally, rt is the policy rate set by
the supranational central bank at the beginning of each period as a reaction
(φCB) to changes in the average demand gap of the economy (gapt−1,AB).6
6Notice that as we focus on demand fluctuations, quantities and prices move in the
same direction, so that the supranational central bank is implicitly targeting inflation as
well.
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rt = rt−1 + φCB gapt−1,AB (16)
After completing all the transactions in the credit market, all borrowers
who have rolled over their debt can now pay back their outstanding loan
from the previous period, RSt−1,h,c.
Also notice that, in case of negative net worth, each commercial bank is
bailed out by the national central bank of the corresponding country via a
transfer of assets.7
3. Model Results
We investigate the micro and macro properties of the model by means of
computer simulations. To this purpose we analyse three main scenarios and
a set of policy experiments. In particular we replicate the following:
• Baseline scenario (BS): individual income shares remain constant through
the simulations;
• Rising-inequality scenario (RS): income shares exogenously change over
time in both countries in order to simulate increasing income dispari-
ties;
• Credit-inequality scenario (CS): the maximum propensity to lend of
the banking sector increases in both countries together with the rise of
inequality as in RS.
The policy experiments include fiscal policies that are simulated with and
without coordination between the two countries. In particular we replicate:
• a Keynesian policy consisting in a bolder reaction of desired govern-
ment spending to the demand gap in RS;
7Note that central banks usually lend secured to commercial banks, thereby taking
collateral to protect against the possibility of loss due to credit and market risk (Rule,
2015). However, as in Cardaci and Saraceno (2016), our simplified framework implies that
bailout operations do not require any collateral or reimbursement so that the national
central bank does not receive any asset in exchange for the transfer of reserves to the
commercial bank. This simplification allows us to rule out banking crises in our model,
and to focus exclusively on household debt as the trigger of financial instability.
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• a Progressive policy implemented through changes in the marginal tax
rates towards a more progressive tax system in RS and CS.
Additionally, we test the ability of the model to replicate some key micro
and macro empirical regularities by looking at cross-correlations and other
relevant statistics.8 In doing so, we also exploit one of the main advantages of
the agent-based approach, which consists in the analysis of the distribution
of key economic variables among heterogeneous agents. This is particularly
useful in order to shed some light on the microeconomic dynamics behind
changes in the aggregate patterns. Finally, we perform both univariate and
multivariate sensitivity analysis thus testing the robustness of model results
to changes in parameter values.
The model is calibrated as reported in Table 2. When possible, parameter
values are the same as in Cardaci and Saraceno (2016) or they are retrieved
from the literature, such as for the value of the capital requirement coeffi-
cient that is in line with Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011).
Exceptions include aA and aB: the calculation of these two values follows
a procedure similar to the one adopted by Belabed et al. (2013). First, for
each country we build a vector whose elements correspond to some key vari-
ables that identify the importance of socio-economic factors (such as the long
term unemployment rate, the employment by job tenure interval, health ex-
penditure as a percentage of GDP, etc.) that mitigate the impact of social
norms, in line with approach discussed in Section 2.1. We collect the data for
each variable from different datasets with reference to Germany and Greece,
which are used as proxies for the core and the periphery of the Eurozone
respectively. Eventually, we compute the Euclidean norm of the two vectors
to calculate the penalty rate for each of the two countries. These are equal to
0.64 for Germany (i.e. country B) and 0.28 for Greece (country A). Finally,
the effective rate of imitation is obtained by subtracting such penalty rates
from the natural rate, which is equal to 0.85.9 Hence, the effective rate of
imitation equals 0.21 for B (Germany) and 0.57 for A (Greece).10
8Notice that our modelling framework does not include many real world features, such
as investment in capital goods, employment dynamics in the labour market, innovation
and progress. As such, we do not carry out a full-scale empirical validation. Rather, we
investigate whether our simple framework captures some essential facts about inequality
and credit.
9The value of the natural rate of imitation is taken from Belabed et al. (2013).
10Notice that the penalty rate for B falls within the range [0.18−0.35] empirically iden-
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Parameter Value
T Number of periods 4000
H Number of households in each country 200
k Propensity to consume for h = 1 : H − 1 0.8
kH Propensity to consume for h = H 0.6
aA Sensitivity parameter to j’s past consumption in A 0.57
aB Sensitivity parameter to j’s past consumption in B 0.21
δ Household share of bank profits 0.2
γ Sensitivity parameter to relative prices 0.6
vmax Maximum propensity to lend 0.3
vmin Minimum propensity to lend 0.1
ρ Bank sensitivity to system risk 0.005
µ Bank sensitivity to TDS 0.005
β Capital requirement coefficient 0.08
φQA Output sensitivity to output gap in A 0.01
φQB Output sensitivity to output gap in B 0.01
φPA Price sensitivity to output gap 0.1
φPB Price sensitivity to output gap 0.01
φG Government sensitivity to output gap 0.05
φCB Central bank sensitivity to output gap 0.05
φv Speed of adjustment for credit supply 0.05
freeze Number of “freezing” periods for bankrupt borrowers 5
χ Bank sensitivity threshold 0.5
Table 2: Model calibration
In all the scenarios, the model starts with the same income distribution
(Figure 2), which is designed to provide an income share of 29.68% for the
top 10% in the two countries, a value in line with the 1970 mean for the
countries reported in Cardaci and Saraceno (2016).
Simulations are replicated by means of Monte Carlo (MC) analysis, select-
ing a different random seed at each run, in line with the prevailing approach
in the macroeconomic agent-based literature (Cardaci, 2016; Russo et al.,
2016; Delli Gatti et al., 2011). In particular, we perform 100 MC repetitions
tified by Drechsel-Grau and Schmid (2014) as the effective rate of imitation for Germany.
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Figure 2: Individual income shares: bar chart (left) and histogram (right).
for each scenario and we compute the cross-simulation mean. Hence, each
of the graphs reported in this section features the average of the time series
across the 100 MC repetitions for each of the three scenarios. Also notice
that we drop the first 200 periods, the so-called transients, that is the stabil-
isation phase of the model. Graphs only show the remaining 3800 periods for
this reason. Finally, we also represent the key data series as simple moving
averages so as to smooth the cyclical fluctuations.
3.1. Scenario analysis
The individual income shares remain constant in BS, while RS and CS
replicate the following permanent shocks to the distribution of income:
• RS: the income share of the top 10% increases gradually (from pe-
riod 301 to period 600) from 29.68% to 36.84% in both countries, a
value which corresponds to the 2007 mean for the countries reported
in Cardaci and Saraceno (2016).
• CS: in addition to the same shock as in RS, in CS vmax rises from 0.3
to 0.65 in period 401, while γ decreases from 0.08 to 0.06.
In general, the baseline scenario (BS) is stable, as all the key time series
(in particular GDP and aggregate desired consumption) in both countries
show minor oscillations along a rather stationary trend (Figure 3 and 4).
Stability is also found at the individual level by looking, in particular, at
the distribution of individual desired consumption over time. Figure 5 shows
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Figure 3: Top: real GDP in A (left) and B (right) in BS (black), RS (dashed grey) and CS
(grey). Bottom: aggregate desired consumption in A (left) and B (right) in BS (black),
RS (dashed grey) and CS (grey).
Figure 4: Current Account (left) and Financial Account (right) in A in BS (black), RS
(dashed grey) and CS (grey).
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that this remains roughly stable over time for any household in both A and
B. As expected, the same graph also shows that desired consumption varies
when moving from the bottom to the top of the income distribution.
Figure 5: Distribution of individual desired consumption over time at the bottom 90%
of the income distribution (left) and at the top 10% (right) in country A (top) and B
(bottom) in BS.
Also notice the rather different shape of the mesh graphs for the two
countries: this shows that desired consumption is more unequally distributed
in A, rather than in B. This is due to the presence of stronger peer effects in
A, which, due to the Pareto distribution of income, result in a more uneven
distribution of desired consumption. This is confirmed also by the ratio
between desired consumption at the richest 20% and at the poorest 20% of
the population, which equals 1.76 in A and 1.54 in B, as well as by the Gini
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coefficient for desired consumption, which is equal (on average) to 0.13 in A
and 0.09 in B (Table 3).
Variable Scenario Average 20/20 ratio Average Gini coefficient
A B A B
Individual consumption
BS 2.03 1.53 0.25 0.09
RS 4.57 3.29 0.39 0.27
CS 5.84 3.38 0.41 0.29
Individual desired consumption
BS 1.76 1.54 0.13 0.09
RS 3.95 3.35 0.31 0.27
CS 4.71 3.48 0.35 0.29
Desired consumption ratio
BS 1.14 0.99 0.09 0.08
RS 1.21 1.01 0.12 0.09
CS 1.33 1.11 0.15 0.11
Table 3: Different measures of (actual and desired) consumption inequality in A and B in
the three scenarios.
Eventually, when inequality rises but credit conditions are unchanged,
the economy performs rather badly in both A and B compared to the base-
line: production falls and it remains persistently below its baseline level. The
dynamics of the balance of payments shows a minor increase in the current
account of A. On the contrary, the rise of inequality in CS results in a much
larger current account deficit for A. Moreover, the time series of GDP show
the presence of major boom-and-bust dynamics in both economies, with big-
ger magnitude in B, as confirmed by Table 4.
Let us now provide a detailed discussion on the impact of growing income
inequality with and without changes in the level of financial deepening in the
economy.
RS scenario
The impact of rising inequality on the economy of the two countries is
roughly similar, in that higher income disparities with unchanged credit con-
ditions eventually lead to falling GDP and aggregate desired consumption
(Figure 3). The negative performance of the two countries is explained by
the increase of income disparities in the presence of peer effects without any
increase in the willingness to lend of the banking sector or any change in the
capital requirement coefficient. Indeed, desired consumption rises for a few
periods after the inequality shock as a consequence of growing expenditure
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Variable Scenario Mean Coefficient of variation
A B A B
GDP
BS 3961.20 3789.65 0.0045 0.0194
RS 3737.21 2445.47 0.0125 0.1131
CS 4038.20 4535.30 0.0178 0.1037
Aggregate desired consumption
BS 10994.84 10050.56 0.0473 0.0173
RS 5715.05 4451.63 0.1892 0.2737
CS 18051.39 11571.48 0.1616 0.1187
Household debt
BS 1576.97 960.11 0.2242 0.3878
RS 681.078 680.93 0.2063 0.2282
CS 13873.14 3832.38 0.3280 0.6714
Current account
BS -332.42 332.42 -0.7659 0.7659
RS 65.06 -65.06 0.8416 -0.8416
CS -4008.95 4008.95 -0.3491 0.3491
Domestic consumption (% of GDP)
BS 23.77 21.38 0.0210 0.0053
RS 26.60 17.63 0.0310 0.0505
CS 28.53 17.51 0.0414 0.0277
Exports (% of GDP)
BS 32.34 35.24 0.0138 0.0259
RS 29.58 28.59 0.0252 0.0293
CS 27.71 20.20 0.0426 0.0586
Table 4: Key statistics for selected variables in the three scenarios.
cascades in both economies, even though the imitation effect is larger in A.
This is consistent with the empirical evidence by Bertrand and Morse (2016),
who show that systematic changes in the behaviour of the non-rich individ-
uals that result in greater spending, after an increase of top income levels,
can be linked to social comparison. However, since the level of financial
deepening has not been modified, households at the bottom of the income
distribution do not find the necessary resources to finance their higher de-
sired consumption so that greater inequality eventually triggers the fall in
consumption and GDP in both economies. This result is also in line with
the closed economy version of this model (Cardaci and Saraceno, 2016).
It is interesting to analyse the distribution of desired consumption follow-
ing the increase in inequality, also in this scenario. This allows in fact to have
a better understanding of the mechanisms driving model dynamics. Figure 6
shows that this variable is, on average, much higher for households at the top
of the income distribution, while it is lower for those at the bottom. Table
3 shows that both the average 20/20 ratio and the Gini coefficient increase
in RS compared to BS in both A and B, thus indicating that rising income
inequality also results in greater consumption inequality. Hence, our find-
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Figure 6: Distribution of individual desired consumption over time at the bottom 90%
of the income distribution (left) and at the top 10% (right) in country A (top) and B
(bottom) in RS.
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ing supports the recent empirical result that consumption inequality tracks
income inequality (Aguiar and Bils, 2015; Attanasio et al., 2014).
As in Cardaci (2016), it is possible to spotlight the economic pressure that
rising inequality under peer effects has on poorer households, by analysing the
change in the distribution of the desired consumption ratio, that is the ratio
between individual desired consumption and income at the beginning of each
period. Our analysis shows that such measure increases for all households,
even though it is slightly more unevenly distributed in RS compared to BS,
as the corresponding average 20/20 ratio increases from 1.14 in BS to 1.21 in
RS. Also the average Gini coefficient increases in RS compared to BS. This
suggests that rising inequality in a poorly financialised context worsens the
performance of the economy as the increase in desired consumption by richer
individuals does not compensate for the fall by poorer households. As such,
the economy enters a recession in both countries.
As already mentioned, the recession in RS is accompanied by a minor
increase in the current account of A (Figure 4), which is the consequence
of a reduction in imports (-29.57% in absolute real terms) that exceeds the
reduction in exports (-13.69% in absolute real terms). Indeed, since the rela-
tive price of goods in A with respect to B falls from 0.98 to 0.85, households
in A increase the share of demand for goods allocated at home.
CS scenario
In this scenario, higher income inequality under peer effects and a greater
level of financialisation lead to an increase in desired consumption in both
countries (Figure 3). Households in country A, who have stronger imitation
in consumption, borrow extensively from the foreign banking sector in order
to finance consumption of both domestic and foreign goods. The consequence
is the emergence of a current account deficit and a financial account surplus
for A, with symmetrically different dynamics for B (Figure 4). Eventually,
the massive accumulation of household debt implies a greater number of
household defaults and an increase in the perception of risk by the foreign
banking sector, which lowers the credit supply thus contributing to a contrac-
tion of consumption spending. Hence, the economies experience a financial
account reversal and a recession. Therefore, this scenario is characterised by
the presence of endogenous business cycle fluctuations along a constant trend
(Figure 3).
Our results seem to go against the stream of literature that was prevailing
in the period before the financial crisis in the United States, which welcomed
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the greater and easier access to credit as an efficient means to insure against
income fluctuations (Krueger and Perri, 2006). Indeed, in our model, higher
availability of credit in a context of rising inequality comes at the price of
greater instability in the overall economy and the emergence of external im-
balances between the two countries.
Figure 7: Distribution of individual desired consumption over time at the bottom 90%
of the income distribution (left) and at the top 10% (right) in country A (top) and B
(bottom) in CS.
Let us provide a detailed analysis of the three major phases of each busi-
ness cycle, corresponding to the expansion of the economy, the turning point
and, in the end, the recession.
Economic expansion. Growing income disparities impact on desired con-
sumption which rises dramatically in both countries (Figure 3). Also in CS,
26
it is possible to evaluate the distribution of desired consumption at the indi-
vidual level (Figure 7). Table 3 shows that both the average 20/20 ratio and
the average Gini coefficient for actual and desired consumption are larger in
CS, in country A and in B. Such measures of inequality increase also for the
desired consumption ratio in both countries. As in the previous scenario, and
similar to Cardaci (2016), this finding suggests that households at the bot-
tom of the income distribution experience a greater need for loans to finance
greater desired consumption in order to catch-up with households who rank
above them in the income scale. Indeed, Figure 8 shows that aggregate de-
sired consumption is positively correlated with aggregate consumption loans
in both A and B (particularly at lag 0, 1 and 2). Hence, rising inequality
results in greater expenditure cascades that trigger higher credit demand in
the present and in future periods.
Figure 8: Cross-correlation between aggregate desired consumption and demand for con-
sumption loans in A (left) and B (right) in CS.
Notice that, in the initial phase, credit demand rises only in A (Figure 9)
due to stronger peer effects in consumption compared to country B. Hence,
a greater number of people at the bottom of the distribution in country A
need external finance to pay for the increased desired consumption.
The most striking implication is that household debt skyrockets in A,
so that the ratio of household debt relative to GDP exceeds the sensitivity
threshold set by the banking sector in A (Figure 9). Hence, bank A cuts
the fraction of credit demand that it is willing to supply: vt,A falls, as shown
in Figure 10. Consequently, a rising fraction of households in A become
credit-rationed at home, thereby sending their loan applications abroad to
the commercial bank in B. This is confirmed the bottom graph in Figure 10,
which shows that the percentage of households in A who borrow from the
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Figure 9: Top: total credit demand in CS (black) compared to BS (grey) in country A
(left) and B (right); bottom: household debt relative to GDP in CS (black) compared to
BS (grey) in country A (left) and B (right).
bank in B rises from roughly 20% to almost 80% in the aftermath of the
shock. In fact, the two series – namely the willingness to lend of the banking
sector in B and the percentage of households in A who borrow from the bank
abroad – are strictly correlated (77.1%, significant at 5%).11
Notice that even though household debt in A keeps on rising, the banking
sector in B is still willing to provide an increasing fraction of credit (middle
graph in Figure 10). The reason why vt,B does not fall following a rise
of household debt in A is that the commercial bank in B sets its sensitivity
threshold based on the average value of household debt to GDP in the overall
economy (as pointed out in Section 2.4). That is, since households in B are
11In general, it seems that the capital requirement coefficient plays a very limited role
in driving model dynamics in CS. In fact, most of the times (98.76% of all periods t, on
average across simulations) the maximum bank supply is equal to the fraction vt,c of total
credit demand that the bank in each country is willing to supply (see Equation 12 above).
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Figure 10: Top: willingness to lend of bank A in BS (black), RS (dashed grey) and CS
(grey); middle: willingness to lend of bank B in BS (black), RS (dashed grey) and CS
(grey); bottom: percentage of households from A who get a loan from bank A (grey) and
bank B (black) in CS.
still poorly indebted, the banking sector in B is prone to lend.
At this stage, rather different patterns emerge in the two countries (Fig-
ure 11): during the ascending phase of the business cycle, country A evolves
into a debt-driven economy with higher real household consumption rela-
tive to GDP (28.53% compared to 23.77% in BS), while country B shifts
to an export-led pattern with increased exports to GDP (40.20% compared
to 35.24% in BS). These remarkable differences between the two economies
arise from the heterogeneity in the imitation parameters, as well as from the
greater financialisation of the overall economy. In other words, households
in A increase their consumption faster than production due to the increased
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credit availability from the banking sector in B.
Figure 11: Top: real domestic consumption relative to GDP in BS (black), RS (dashed
grey) and CS (grey) in country A (left) and B (right); bottom: real exports relative to
GDP in BS (black), RS (dashed grey) and CS (grey) in country A (left) and B (right).
As noted above, greater credit availability with increased demand for
loans from households in A drives the dynamics of both the current account
and the financial account in the two countries. As households in A borrow a
greater amount of loans from the commercial bank in B, the financial account
of A rises, while the current account deficit worsens due to increasing imports
from B (Figure 4).
Turning point. After a number of periods, also the level of household debt
in B starts to rise, in particular in correspondence to the peak of GDP in the
same country. Thus, the average household debt to GDP in the overall econ-
omy rises above the sensitivity threshold set by the commercial bank in B, so
that credit availability shrinks. Since the banking sector in B lends almost
exclusively to households from A, the increasing shortage of credit supply af-
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fects mostly foreign households, thus having two major consequences: first,
the percentage of successful credit applicants among households in A starts
to fall – from almost 80% it eventually reaches roughly 20%) – so that house-
hold debt in A decreases and the willingness to lend of the commercial bank
of A improves; secondly, a growing percentage of households from A send
their loan applications back to the commercial bank in the same country.
Bust. The whole process of credit contraction generates a dramatic fall
of aggregate demand in A, since households lack the external resources to
finance desired consumption. On the other hand, A’s imports drop and its
current account improves. The financial account of A, instead, falls as a result
of the lower amount of loans from the foreign banking system. Country B
also experiences a recession, but in this case it is characterised by plunging
real exports (equal to A’s imports).
Notice that all dynamics revert after a few periods, such that a new
business cycle starts again whenever the commercial bank in B restores its
willingness to lend.
3.2. Policy responses
In addition to the three scenarios discussed above, we analyse how model
dynamics change when policy makers react to rising inequality by imple-
menting different kinds of fiscal policies in the two countries. In particular,
first we assess the effectiveness of a Keynesian type of policy consisting in a
bolder reaction of desired government spending to the demand gap. Eventu-
ally, we analyse the consequences of a change in the tax system into a more
progressive one. Similar to the closed economy version of the model, also in
this case our results suggest that the second type of policy has a clearer and
stronger effect on the overall economy with respect to an intervention of the
first type.
The simulation procedure for the Keynesian policy follows Cardaci and
Saraceno (2016), in that we randomly draw 20 different values for φG and
for each of them we also perform 100 MC repetitions in each of the three
scenarios (hence, we perform 6000 computer simulations in total). This policy
intervention is simulated with and without coordination: in the first case, φG
changes equally in both countries, whereas in the second case the change is
different in A and B.
Regardless of the presence of coordination, our results indicate that a
bolder fiscal policy does not prevent the economy from entering a recession
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in both countries in RS, and its implications are also non-tangible in the CS
scenario as the time series of all the key variables do not show any significant
difference in terms of magnitude, duration and volatility of the boom and
bust cycles.
The second kind of fiscal policy consists in changing the marginal tax
rates in a way such that the system becomes more progressive. In particular,
we simulate 10 different compositions of the marginal tax rates (which are
the same in the countries) and we run 100 Monte Carlo repetitions for each
of them (thus having 1000 simulations in total).
Our results show that such policy has a positive impact on the overall
economy. In particular, a more progressive tax system manages to counter-
balance (at least partially) the negative effect of rising inequality in RS.12
Progressivity variation (%) country Average GDP
GDP variation
(%)
Coefficient of
variation
RS with baseline tax rates
A 3737.21 0.0125
B 2445.47 0.1131
+4.89
A 3764.11 0.72 0.010
B 2582.66 5.61 0.071
+7.49
A 3770.47 0.89 0.008
B 2608.09 6.65 0.063
+17.8
A 3782.80 1.22 0.005
B 2668.74 9.13 0.035
+23.69
A 3789.16 1.39 0.004
B 2675.83 9.42 0.032
Table 5: The impact of progressive taxation for selected different degrees of progressivity.
The column “GDP variation” identifies the variation of average GDP with the new tax
rates with respect to the RS scenario.
Our result seems to support the arguments recently put forward by the
International Monetary Fund that advanced economies with relatively low
levels of progressivity in their taxation systems may have scope for raising
the top marginal tax rates as this does not hamper economic growth (IMF,
2017). In fact, Table 5 shows that when the marginal tax rates change, thus
becoming more progressive in both countries, the average GDP is higher.
It is also worth noticing that a more progressive tax system corresponds to
12The degree of progressivity is measured as follows: first, for each class of income we
calculate the percentage change in the corresponding marginal tax rate in each simulated
tax composition. Eventually, we calculate the mean of such percentage changes and we
consider this as the change in the overall degree of progressivity.
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lower volatility, as the coefficient of variation is lower for higher progressivity
variations.
Hence, a more progressive tax system allows a greater share of poorer
households to rely on internal financial resources, thus implying also lower
levels of debt accumulation and a more stable economy. As such, our sim-
ulations confirm the positive impact of a progressive tax system also in the
context of an open economy (within a currency union). In a sense, redis-
tributive policies bring the system back towards the baseline scenario with
stable GDP dynamics. Notice, however, that GDP still remains below the
baseline value in both countries and this result holds true for any of the 10
simulated tax systems.
To conclude this section, we want to point out that our rather simpli-
fied modelling framework does not allow to take into account the possible
distortionary effects that greater progressivity may have on other aspects of
the economy, such as the functioning of labour markets or firm profits and
investment decisions. The interpretation of our results should therefore be
limited to considering that an increase in progressivity is more efficient than
macroeconomic policies at tackling the expenditure cascades that follow the
rise of inequality. Any further interpretation would be unwarranted given
the simplified structure of our model.
3.3. Sensitivity Analysis
The purpose of univariate and multivariate sensitivity analysis is to assess
the robustness of our results by running the simulations under different cal-
ibrations. In other words, we want to understand whether the main findings
of our model are biased by the choice of our parameter vector.
Univariate analysis allows to look at variations in the outcome of the
model while changing one parameter at a time, leaving all the other con-
stant. Eventually, “the model is then believed to be good if the output
values of interest do not vary significantly despite significant changes in the
input values” (Delli Gatti et al., 2011, p. 77). Hence, we follow the same ap-
proach adopted for the robustness check of the closed-economy version of this
model reported in Cardaci and Saraceno (2016): we select 17 parameters and
we randomly draw 20 values within a reasonable min-max interval for each
individual parameter at a time, leaving all the other ones unchanged. For
each of the 20 parameter values, we run 100 Monte Carlo repetitions, each
with a different random seed, in all the three scenarios (i.e. BS, RS and CS).
As such, for each single parameter, the univariate analysis results in 6000
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Parameter
Variation in
parameter (%)
Country
Variation in
GDP-BS at t
500 (%)
Variation in
GDP-RS at t
1000 (%)
Variation in
GDP-CS at t
1000 (%)
k 45.89
A 4.29 10.78 8.67
B 29.36 111.95 75.13
aA 113.31
A 4.12 9.31 6.22
B 36.12 82.66 58.48
aB 154.14
A 3.87 10.04 9.33
B 28.01 87.98 90.93
ρ 3325.3
A 0.89 2.29 3.54
B 6.29 17.91 23.86
µ 3466.94
A 1.48 4.10 3.35
B 5.29 23.63 20.33
φQA 866.31
A 14.31 20.11 18.47
B 8.93 24.59 24.58
φQB 287.84
A 1.12 7.08 2.79
B 15.02 62.43 32.96
γ 227.46
A 2.73 7.16 6.20
B 7.62 32.07 28.19
δ 266.97
A 2.23 5.51 5.43
B 15.47 54.46 38.41
φPA 166.47
A 1.41 4.39 5.53
B 3.48 21.63 30.07
φPB 837.36
A 2.18 10.15 3.43
B 14.29 30.85 16.54
φG 737.71
A 1.31 4.35 3.67
B 5.43 26.06 18.67
φCB 838.14
A 1.09 5.72 2.94
B 6.34 32.69 17.75
φV 360.01
A 1.08 6.02 3.19
B 6.81 29.12 20.79
χ 471.85
A 0.73 4.53 7.31
B 8.24 26.97 71.63
freeze 596.13
A 2.38 3.01 4.47
B 22.21 35.21 27.44
β 341.75
A 1.95 6.38 11.76
B 3.41 4.64 9.89
Table 6: Min-max variations in parameter values for univariate sensitivity analysis, to-
gether with corresponding cross-series variation in GDP at time 500 in BS and at time
1000 in RS and CS, for both country A and B.
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simulations. Since we explore 17 parameters, we run 102000 simulations in
total.
The results of our univariate analysis highlight the robustness of our re-
sults. In fact, in most cases, output variations are greatly smaller than the
variations in the parameters. Table 6 reports the variation for each parame-
ter between its minimum and maximum value in the sensitivity analysis and
the corresponding cross-series variation in GDP at time 500 for BS and at
time 1000 for RS and CS for both country A and B. Results also confirm
that country A is less sensitive to changes in model parameters compared
to country B since, for any change in the calibration of the model, min-max
variations in model output are larger in country B (with the exception of the
univariate analysis of φQA in BS). Among the most relevant parameters, in
terms of impact on model dynamics, the univariate analysis seems to confirm
the primary role of the consumption parameters k, aA and aB. Compared
to the closed economy model (Cardaci and Saraceno, 2016), the min-max
cross-series variation in GDP is larger in RS than in CS in most cases, such
as for univariate changes of k, µ, γ, etc.
Another robustness check that we perform consists in computing the per-
centage of consistent simulations for each of the parameters tested in the
univariate analysis. To this purpose, we calculate the mean and the variance
of selected key variables (i.e. GDP, desired consumption, household debt,
credit demand and household default rate) along the entire time span in the
three scenarios for each of the two countries. Eventually, we compare these
values, obtained under the different calibrations used in the sensitivity anal-
ysis, with the same values obtained with the standard calibration reported
in Table 2.
For example, based on the standard calibration, both the mean and the
variance of GDP are lower in RS and higher in CS, compared to the baseline
values, in both A and B. As such, we check whether GDP has the same
qualitative behaviour in terms of mean and variance in any other univariate
simulation. For instance, we find that, ceteris paribus, most of the randomly
selected values of k imply that both the mean and the variance of GDP are
lower in RS and higher in CS. In particular, we claim that 80.83% of the
univariate simulations for k are successful.
After repeating this experiment for all the parameters tested in the uni-
variate analysis (Table 7), we find that, on average, 91.36% of univariate
simulations are consistent with our initial calibration, based on the criterion
mentioned above.
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Parameter
Consistent
simulations (%)
Parameter
Consistent
simulations (%)
k 80.83 φPA 95.83
aA 95.5 φPB 93.3
aB 85.5 φG 94.16
ρ 98.3 φCB 95.83
µ 95.3 φV 90
φQA 97.2 χ 93.05
φQB 66.7 freeze 94.72
γ 93.05 β 97.6
δ 85.5
Average 91.36
Table 7: Percentage of consistent simulations in the univariate sensitivity analysis.
Multivariate analysis consists in analysing model results under different
calibrations of model parameters. In this case, we build 20 vectors for our pa-
rameters and we randomly draw each value in the vector within a reasonable
interval. Eventually, for each of the 20 vectors, we perform 100 MC repeti-
tions, each with a different random seed. We do so in the three scenarios,
thereby running a total amount of 6000 simulations.
Also the multivariate analysis shows that the behaviour of the model is
robust to parameter changes. Indeed, we compute the percentage of con-
sistent simulations also for the multivariate analysis. Based on the same
criteria described above, our test identifies 73.3% of consistent simulations
in the multivariate case, thus leading us to conclude that the model is robust
also to multivariate changes in model parameters.
4. Conclusion
The contribution by Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015) shows that in the period
between the introduction of the Euro and the outburst of the recent financial
crisis, the Eurozone accumulated a sizeable amount of cross-country capital
flows from the core countries to the peripheral ones. Hence, in their view,
peripheral nations relied heavily on intra-Eurozone foreign lending to finance
their current account deficits, while core nations reported substantially large
current account surpluses. Recent empirical works (such as Marzinotto, 2016)
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show that such imbalances in the Eurozone seem to be due to the increase in
income disparities in a context of financial deepening. Indeed, easier access
to credit for the poorer segments of society resulted in a massive accumu-
lation of household debt via domestic and foreign lending, thereby leading
to current account deficits in the periphery and surpluses in the core. In
general, Belabed et al. (2013) and Kumhof et al. (2012) show that rising
inequality can determine a diverging pattern in the balance of payments of
different countries, depending on the level of financialisation of the economy.
In line with these contributions, our paper extends Cardaci and Saraceno
(2016) by introducing two countries operating in a currency union. Our
model allows to capture the major role that inequality plays in determining
large external imbalances, in line with Kumhof et al. (2012) and Belabed
et al. (2013). In particular, our results suggest that rising inequality with
a higher level of financial deepening leads to the emergence of a debt-led
consumption growth regime in the country with stronger peer effects, while
resulting in an export-led regime and sluggish internal demand growth in the
other country, as suggested by Stockhammer (2015). The former records a
current account deficit and a financial account surplus due to the massive
inflow of consumption loans supplied by the foreign banking sector, which
allow households to finance the higher desired spending for consumption at
home and abroad. Hence, our model captures the flow of capital that finances
the imbalances over the expanding phase of the economy. Eventually, a
crisis emerges endogenously as a consequence of the massive accumulation
of household debt that triggers a change in the perception of system risk on
behalf of the banking sector of the lending country. As such, a sudden stop
occurs, in that the representative commercial bank in this country shrinks
the credit supply thereby forcing households in the deficit country to lower
their domestic consumption and imports substantially.
We believe that our model represents a suitable theoretical framework
that contributes to the study of these macroeconomic imbalances in the Eu-
rozone in the presence of rising inequality. Yet, different improvements could
be implemented in future research. In our view, the most interesting exten-
sion might consist in the introduction of endogenous wage inequality, which
could be implemented with the introduction of heterogeneous firms that can
hire and fire workers, thus allowing for the simulation of bargain processes
in wage setting mechanisms. This would also allow to study changes in un-
employment dynamics in the different phases of the economic cycle.
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Appendix A. Appendix - Balance of Payments and Target 2 Im-
balances
Our model features the inclusion of a stylised version of the Target 2 (T2)
mechanism. The framework we have adopted is based on a post-crisis setting
(Auer, 2014; Cecchetti et al., 2012). Hence, for simplicity we assume there is
no interbank lending in our economy. This has two major consequences: 1)
whenever a country records a current account (CA) deficit, this is matched
by changes in T2 positions, unless the CA deficit is outbalanced by a capital
inflow in the form of deposits arising from household debt with the foreign
bank; 2) a current account deficit does not change the reserve account of the
commercial bank of the deficit country because any loss of reserves is entirely
matched by a refinancing operation by the national central bank, in that the
national central bank provides the commercial bank with an unsecured loan
(LCBt,c in our model). Indeed, since we assume that banks do not provide
any collateral when they borrow from the corresponding national central
banks, there is no limit to the changes in the net Target 2 position of a
country.
Therefore, the design of the T2 mechanism in our model implies that
the net Target 2 position of a country changes automatically in order to
match the gap between current and financial accounts. Hence, a CA deficit
(surplus) that is not matched by a financial surplus (deficit) is going to be
matched by a negative (positive) variation of the T2 position of the country
vis-a-vis the ECB. This in line with the actual functioning of T2 in the Euro
41
area, where the compensation between current and financial accounts runs
through Target 2: “The system works by providing national central banks
with credits and debits in the form of a bilateral position vis-a-vis the ECB,
usually recorded on the balance sheets as either Intra-Eurosystem Claims or
Intra-Eurosystem Assets” (Whelan, 2014, p. 7). Therefore, Target 2 does
a job similar to creating foreign exchange reserves for a country that faces
a balance of payments crisis. As argued by (Cecchetti et al., 2012, p. 5),
“the only limit on capital outflows, and the only limit on the liability that
the country’s central bank can amass with respect to the remainder of the
Eurosystem, is the collateral that the country’s banks have available to bring
to the refinancing operation”. However, since the system operates automat-
ically, there seems to be no natural break. In essence, this is what happened
after the 2009-2010 sudden stop that occurred in the Euro periphery: if these
countries had not been Euro-area members, they would have likely suffered
a harsh current account adjustment through a currency crisis. Indeed, out-
side the Eurozone, if a country with a fixed exchange rate regime and a CA
deficit happens to experience a so-called “sudden stop” (e.g. a capital ac-
count reversal because of a confidence loss by investors), the country will
have a depletion of foreign reserves. Yet, this is obviously limited by the
amount of foreign reserves owned by the national central bank. In order to
avoid loosing all of its foreign reserves, the country has no other option than
devaluating its currency or allowing to let it float on the open market. In-
stead, the countries in the periphery of the Eurozone, “remained in the Euro
area and continued to run current account deficits, despite rapidly falling
private capital inflows, and, in some cases, capital flight” (Hale, 2013, p. 4).
In fact, this was possible because of Target 2. Indeed, according to Auer
(2014) and Cecchetti et al. (2012), T2 balances were actually financing the
flight of private capital from the periphery to the core that was due to the
sudden stop triggered by the global financial crisis. Cecchetti et al. (2012)
finds that, starting from 2012, the relationship between current accounts and
T2 balances strongly favours this interpretation, since the changes in T2 bal-
ances substantially exceeded the value of current accounts. Also Auer (2014)
points out that changes in T2 balances simply reflected the fact that the
financing of CA deficits changed with the onset of the financial crisis, due to
the reversal of capital flows.
In addition to this, the specific design of the T2 mechanism in our model,
which implies the presence of unsecured refinancing operations, is a direct
representation of the difficulty of refinancing through interbank lending. In-
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deed, any transactions between two countries changes the amount of reserves
that a commercial bank has in its account at the national central bank.
Hence, in the deficit country, the bank can recover from the reserve-loss by
borrowing on the interbank market directly from another commercial bank
abroad (the typical pre-2008 solution in the Eurozone). This would clear
the net Target 2 positions of the two countries since there is a cross-country
payment going from one country to other, in the opposite direction with
respect to the original transaction. Yet, suppose that interbank borrowing
becomes difficult so that the market breaks down, as it has after the 2008
crisis (Cesaratto, 2013). In this case, there would be no loans flowing from
a bank to the other and, as a consequence, some banks would not recover
from the loss of reserves. Hence, the solution is that the central bank re-
plenishes the reserve account of the commercial bank through a short or long
term refinancing operation. That is, the central bank supplies a loan to the
commercial bank as in our model. This operation does not change the net
T2 position of the countries.
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